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29. 14.22.02.02 (2012).
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Development of DNA-testing technology has helpedexculpate innocent defendants.1 Between 1989 and2003, many of the 74 American prisoners sentenced to
death were exonerated thanks to DNA evidence.2 For instance,
in cases where the identity of the perpetrator was the key, DNA
evidence can be of “central importance,” especially when it is
the only forensic evidence available.3 However, exculpation of
innocent defendants does not provide a satisfactory rationale
when the question is whether it is constitutional for govern-
ments to require DNA tests on all defendants arrested and
charged with a felony. 
Currently, some state statutes require DNA tests on all
felony arrestees. For example, California’s DNA and Forensic
Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act (hereinafter
“California DNA Act”) requires that DNA samples be taken
from all adults arrested for or charged with any felony offense
“immediately following arrest, or during the booking . . .
process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest.”4
The statute was enacted out of “critical and urgent need . . . for
accurately and expeditiously identifying, apprehending, arrest-
ing, and convicting criminal offenders and exonerating per-
sons wrongly suspected or accused of crime.”5 Once officers
collect the DNA sample pursuant to the statute, it is sent to a
state laboratory.6 The laboratory then creates a DNA profile of
the arrestee solely for identification purposes.7 It analyzes thir-
teen genetic markers known as “junk DNA,” which are non-
genetic stretches of the DNA that are not linked to any known
genetic traits.8 After the analysis using “short tandem repeat”
technology, it creates a unique profile that law enforcement
uses for identification.9 The laboratory then uploads the DNA
profile into the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a
nationwide collection of federal, state, and local DNA pro-
files.10 Once an arrestee’s DNA profile is uploaded into CODIS,
it is compared with the DNA samples collected from crime
scenes.11 The statute provides some protection against misuse
of the information obtained from the tests.12 For example, only
law-enforcement officials may access a DNA profile, and they
may not use the DNA for purposes other than to identify crim-
inal suspects.13 Moreover, state law punishes unauthorized
access or disclosure of DNA information by up to a year in
prison and a fine of up to $50,000,14 and a DNA record may
not be permanent and can be expunged under certain circum-
stances.15
There is a federal statute that is largely identical to the
California statute. The DNA Fingerprint Act, amended in 2005
and 2006, allows the Attorney General to “collect DNA sam-
ples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges” of a
federal felony.16 There are also other state laws that require
DNA testing on all defendants arrested for and charged with a
felony. For example, the Maryland DNA Collection Act
requires the government to collect the DNA samples of people
who are charged with felony burglary.17
Using California’s DNA Act as the model statute, this article
will examine whether it is constitutional to require pretrial
DNA testing on all felony arrestees under the Fourth
Amendment as well as other parts of the Constitution, specifi-
cally the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination;
the Sixth Amendment provision for effective assistance of
counsel; substantive and procedural due process; and equal
protection. The analysis will apply equally to federal and state
courts, because all of these parts of the Constitution apply to
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and
seizures be reasonable.19 Mandatory DNA testing constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.20 It is settled law that
the DNA-indexing statutes authorize both a physical intrusion
to obtain a tissue sample and a chemical analysis to obtain pri-
vate physiological information about a person and therefore
are subject to the Fourth Amendment.21
Generally, a valid search under the Fourth Amendment
requires a warrant issued upon probable cause.22 However a
warrantless search can be reasonable even without probable
cause or any individualized suspicion.23 In determining
whether a warrantless DNA search is reasonable, federal courts
have used either the totality-of-the-circumstances test or the
special-needs doctrine.24
A. TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES TEST VS. 
SPECIAL-NEEDS DOCTRINE 
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, determining
whether a search is reasonable involves balancing the degree of
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and “‘the degree to
which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’”25 Similarly, the special-needs doc-
trine involves balancing the individual’s privacy expectations
against the government’s interests.26 The difference between
the two tests is the degree of importance that the governmen-
tal interest carries. The totality-of-the-circumstances test does
not require as strong an interest as the special-needs doctrine
does.27 Therefore, if requiring DNA testing for all people
charged with a felony is to be constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment regardless of which test a court uses, it must sat-
isfy the special-needs doctrine. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUM-
STANCES TEST 
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, courts
are likely to allow governments to mandate DNA tests on all
people arrested and charged with a felony. Balancing the
intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy interests against the gov-
ernment’s interest in collecting and testing his DNA, courts
have held that conducting pretrial DNA testing on felony
arrestees does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.28
First, the privacy intrusion
involves invasion of bodily
integrity and revelation of personal
identity.29 With regard to bodily
intrusion, courts are likely to hold
that intrusion on bodily integrity is
minimal. For example, in Haskell v.
Harris, the Ninth Circuit held that
a buccal swab—a common method
for collecting DNA samples—is a
“de minimis” invasion because it gently sweeps along an
arrestee’s inner cheek.30 Similarly, the Third Circuit held that
the act of collecting a DNA sample is “‘neither a significant
nor an unusual intrusion.’”31 The court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that blood tests using venipuncture
“‘do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an indi-
vidual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity.’”32 It further
explained that the FBI’s current method of collecting a blood
sample involves a finger prick, which is a far less invasive pro-
cedure than venipuncture.33 The court held that this method,
as well as the buccal swab, are both “minimal” and are not sig-
nificant or unusual intrusions.34
Regarding the second type of privacy invasion—revelation
of identity and other personal information—defendants also
face a difficult task. Although arrestees have a greater expecta-
tion of privacy than convicted defendants, they are “not enti-
tled to the full panoply of rights and protections possessed by
the general public.”35 Such diminished expectations of privacy
are justified by the probable-cause finding, which is necessary
for a valid arrest.36 Therefore, arrestees have diminished pri-
vacy interests in their identity.37 Moreover, profiles collected
from DNA testing and entered into CODIS reveal only identity
and no other significant personal information, such as familial
lineage, predisposition to genetic conditions and diseases, or
genetic markers for traits such as aggression, sexual orienta-
tion, substance addiction, and criminal tendencies.38
Therefore, it is not likely that arrestee defendants can success-
fully claim misuse of DNA information in a way that violates
their privacy interests.    
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Compared to this minimal
privacy intrusion, courts have
held that the government’s
compelling interests in con-
ducting DNA tests outweigh
the privacy invasion.39 Such
compelling interests include
promoting increased accuracy
in the investigation and prose-
cution of criminal cases, which
involves identifying arrestees;
solving past crimes; preventing
future crimes; and exonerating the innocent.40 Particularly,
DNA testing is a better and more accurate source of identifica-
tion than fingerprinting—perpetrators can easily hide their
fingerprints by wearing gloves, but they cannot mask their
DNA.41 Moreover, DNA testing will help reduce recidivism
because if a felony arrestee knows that his DNA is in the gov-
ernment’s database, he is less likely to commit another crime.42
In sum, cases suggest that governmental interests outweigh
the minimal degree of privacy intrusion from DNA testing.
Therefore, mandatory pretrial DNA tests are likely to be
upheld under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
Nevertheless, further analysis is needed under the special-
needs doctrine, which applies stricter standards in reviewing
governmental interests. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE SPECIAL-NEEDS DOCTRINE 
Under the special-needs doctrine, an otherwise invalid war-
rantless search under the Fourth Amendment is reasonable if it
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement.43 In determining whether there are spe-
cial government needs, it is necessary to balance the individ-
ual’s privacy expectations against the government’s interests.44
If balancing the two factors leads to the conclusion that it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized
suspicion in the particular context, the warrantless search is
considered reasonable.45
In Green v. Berge,46 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the spec-
trum of privacy interests that must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment. At one end is the privacy interest of an
unsuspected person not under any custody, whose interests
receive the highest protection.47 At the other end are the
diminished privacy expectations of incarcerated felons.48
Given this spectrum, the question is: On which side of the
spectrum does the privacy interest of a person arrested and
charged with a felony fall? One recent case suggests that pri-
vacy expectations of such people are likely to be on the lower
side of the spectrum. 
In United States v. Thomas,49 the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York considered a federal statute that
authorized the government to subject people charged with fed-
eral crimes to DNA tests. The court held that the privacy intru-
sion was “‘quite small’” due to the defendant’s status as an
indictee.50 Regardless of whether a person is under pretrial
detention, “‘when a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his
identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and
he can hardly claim privacy in it.’”51 On the other hand, the
government had a compelling interest in rapidly solving crimes
by maintaining DNA records of arrestees’ identities.52 Thus, the
court upheld the federal statute because the governmental
interests outweighed the minimal degree of privacy invasion.53
It should be noted that Thomas suggests that governmental
interests outweigh an indictee’s privacy interests, regardless of
whether the indictee is in pretrial custody or not. This logic of
the court is proper for several reasons. First, because all
indictees are treated the same regardless of whether they are in
pretrial custody, the results of the anaylsis do not hinge on
unfortunate happenstances. In other words, if the court came
to different conclusions based on the assumption that detained
indictees and undetained indictees have different privacy inter-
ests, results would depend on one’s lawyer being competent
enough to argue for pretrial release or perhaps on the arbi-
trariness of the judge at a bond hearing. Second, the logic not
only promotes the government’s interest of expedited disposi-
tion of cases but also furthers the defendant’s interest in a
speedy trial.  
In determining whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
speedy-trial rights are violated, one of the balancing factors is
whether the defendant is prejudiced by the delay of trial.54 A
defendant is deemed to be prejudiced by delay if he will suffer
oppressive pretrial incarceration with accompanying idleness,
loss of a job, and disruption of family life.55 Moreover, even if
the defendant is not under any pretrial custody or if he is
released under bail, he will have to suffer anxiety, suspicion,
and hostility also recognized in Sixth Amendment analysis.56
This suggests that courts are concerned with the impact of Sixth
Amendment violations on the private life of the defendant. 
In a similar vein, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect the privacy and security of citizens.57 The Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted after a person is
charged with a crime, just as the Sixth Amendments applies to
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people charged with a crime. Therefore, Fourth Amendment
analysis must not be blind to the concerns embraced under
Sixth Amendment analysis. That is, Fourth Amendment
analysis should consider factors including the defendant’s loss
of freedom caused by pretrial custody, or, if the defendant is
not under custody, the anxiety, suspicion, and hostility that he
suffers. 
This framework suggests that courts’ decisions upholding
mandatory pretrial DNA testing protect defendants from
unwarranted intrusions on privacy. By expeditiously finding
out the identity of the felon and confirming that the defendant
is not the perpetrator, the government can protect the defen-
dant from loss of liberty caused by pretrial incarceration or, if
the defendant is not under pretrial custody, can protect the
defendant from further suspicion, anxiety, and hostility. 
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT
Under the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion, a person must not “‘be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.’”58 If the prosecution obtains
statements from the defendant (either exculpatory or inculpa-
tory) through custodial interrogation initiated by the police
without informing him of the procedural safeguards to protect
his privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution may
not use such statements against the defendant once the legal
proceeding begins.59 The requirement of DNA testing raises a
Fifth Amendment issue because the testing does not involve
any prior Miranda warnings, such as a person being informed
that he has “the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires.”60
A. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The threshold question would be whether “custodial inter-
rogation” takes place when the government conducts DNA
testing. First, a suspect is under “custody” when there is “‘a
“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.’”61 Incarceration of any
form satisfies this test.62 On the other hand, a temporary and
relatively nonthreatening detention, such as a traffic stop or
Terry stop,63 does not constitute Miranda custody.64 Under
the statute mandating DNA tests on all felony arrestees, the
DNA test must be done “immediately following arrest, or dur-
ing the booking.”65 In other words, DNA tests are likely to be
done while the defendant is under pretrial custody.  
B. TESTIMONIAL OR COM-
MUNICATIVE EVIDENCE 
Assuming that DNA testing
is done when a person is under
custody, the next question is
whether an interrogation took
place. Interrogation encom-
passes express questioning, as
well as any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the suspect.66 DNA testing is not likely to
involve express questioning. It would rather involve actions in
an attempt to obtain identification information—which may,
in effect, be incriminating. In that sense, DNA testing can be
regarded as interrogation.
However, regardless of whether there is custodial interroga-
tion, it is important to note that the right against self-incrimi-
nation applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not provided a clear test
as to what constitutes “testimony.”67 Yet, the court has noted
that “‘[i]t is the “extortion of information from the accused,”
the attempt to force him “to disclose the contents of his own
mind,” that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause.’”68 This
suggests, first, that the court defines “testimony” as substan-
tive cognition—the product of cognition that results in hold-
ing or asserting propositions with truth-value,69 and second,
that the state must cause this cognition for the Fifth
Amendment to be implicated.70 In sum, the government may
not compel defendants to reveal incriminating substantive
results of cognition caused by the government.71
The question then becomes whether the results of DNA
testing constitute testimony. The answer is likely to be no,
because the tests involve examination of physiological fea-
tures, and such features cannot be altered by change in the
examinee’s cognition or perception. Therefore, even if DNA
testing is compelled by the government, analysis under the
right against self-incrimination is likely to be implausible.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel.72 The right to effective assis-
tance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake but
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial.73
The right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when
the accused is not able to receive a fair trial because the chal-
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lenged conduct has affected the
reliability of the trial process.74
A trial is unfair if the accused is
denied counsel at a “critical
stage” of his trial.75 At such a
critical stage, the government
violates the accused’s right to
counsel if it “interferes in certain
ways with the ability of coun-
sel to make independent deci-
sions about how to conduct the
defense.”76
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUR-
RENT STATUTE 
California’s current DNA statute mandates all felony
arrestees to be subject to DNA tests. In other words, even if
an arrestee is afforded an attorney, counsel cannot advise the
client as to whether he should subject himself to a DNA test.
Considering that the results of the DNA test may yield incul-
pating evidence, the government essentially prevents the
defense counsel from making independent decisions about
how to conduct the defense. As a result, a felony arrestee is
not afforded effective assistance of counsel during the pretrial
phase. Therefore, the important question would be whether
the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel
takes place at a critical stage of the trial. If so, the government
would be violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 
B. CRITICAL STAGE OF TRIAL 
Critical stages of trial include any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in or out of court, where counsel’s absence
might detract from the accused’s right to a fair trial.77 The
scope of critical stages reaches pretrial phases because the pres-
ence of counsel at critical confrontations, such as at the trial
itself, assures that the accused’s interests will be protected in a
manner consistent with our adversary theory of criminal pros-
ecution.78
Such critical stages are distinguished from a “mere prepara-
tory step” at which no right to counsel is guaranteed.79 The
Constitution does not guarantee the right to assistance of
counsel in the prosecution’s preparatory step of gathering evi-
dence.80 This includes the government’s systematized or scien-
tific analyzing of the accused’s fingerprints, blood sample,
clothing, and hair.81 The rationale is that knowledge of rele-
vant scientific and technological techniques is sufficiently
available, and there are few variables in techniques.82
Therefore, the accused has an opportunity for a meaningful
confrontation with the government’s case at trial through
cross-examination of the government’s expert witnesses and
the presentation of evidence from his own experts.83
This may at first glance suggest that the process of DNA
testing falls under the mere preparatory step of gathering evi-
dence. However, the Court was careful to note that the ratio-
nale behind this distinction is that the accused has the oppor-
tunity to meaningfully challenge the government’s case at trial.
Therefore, to determine whether the mandated DNA test con-
stitutes a critical stage or a mere preparatory step, the critical
question is whether the defendant has an opportunity to mean-
ingfully confront the government’s DNA evidence. The answer
to the question is that there is no such opportunity. 
For a defendant to have a fair trial, the government’s DNA
analysis should be challenged. The results of DNA tests may be
biased because DNA experts have intimate connections with
the laboratories and financial interests in the DNA tests.84
Sometimes the experts’ careers hinge on the success of the tests
and the admissibility of test results.85 Almost all crime labora-
tories are connected to law-enforcement agencies, which raises
the risk that laboratories will be subject to police and prosecu-
tor interests in obtaining convictions rather than pursuing
objective truth.86 Nevertheless, there is no opportunity for the
defendant to meaningfully challenge the government’s DNA
evidence at trial for several reasons. 
First, a defense counsel may lack the scientific knowledge
required to meaningfully examine the accuracy of the DNA
evidence. To clearly explain to the jury what the DNA evi-
dence shows, the defense counsel should know how to pre-
sent the evidence and identify and refute the prosecutor’s fail-
ings.87 However, defense counsel may not be familiar with
specific scientific theories that are at issue in a case and may
therefore be unable to provide the detailed analysis that an
appointed expert might provide.88 Moreover, defense coun-
sel cannot testify in front of the jury.89 Therefore, the only
remedy would be to question the prosecution’s expert, who is
unlikely to give testimony unfavorable to himself or his
processes.90
Second, the statute affects the ability of indigent defendants
to put forth a meaningful defense in jurisdictions where courts
do not appoint independent experts for indigent defendants. In
some jurisdictions, an indigent defendant has no such right to
appointment of an independent expert on the grounds that
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DNA experts can do no more than passively inform or educate
a defense attorney.91 Because uncertainties and ambiguities
may affect any DNA test, relying on one expert carries a sig-
nificant risk that a jury will misunderstand or inaccurately
evaluate the meaning or significance of DNA evidence.92
Experts present the results of a DNA test in “stark, black-and-
white terms that do not fully reflect the potential problems that
can affect any test.”93 A jury is often simply informed that two
samples match and that the match has a certain statistical sig-
nificance.94 Moreover, “an expert who exaggerates the signifi-
cance of a declared match is not likely to explain how this sig-
nificance is exaggerated.”95 As a result, the absence of an inde-
pendent analysis of the DNA sample will diminish the reliabil-
ity of the results of the trial.  
In sum, a felony arrestee will not have an opportunity to
meaningfully confront the government’s evidence at trial.
Thus, the moment at which he is subject to DNA test before
trial is a critical stage of trial, rather than a mere preparatory
step. Therefore, because the statute automatically requires
DNA testing on all felony arrestees without any consultation
with their counsels, the statute violates the defendant’s right to
assistance of counsel. 
IV. DUE PROCESS    
In Graham v. Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection. . . , that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’” gov-
erns the analysis.96 However, nine years later in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,97 the court held that this holding in
Graham does not bar the court from reaching the due-process
question.98 The court held that “‘if a constitutional claim is
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the
Fourth . . . Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the
standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
rubric of substantive due process.’”99 Therefore, if a claim
involves “searches and seizures” covered by the Fourth
Amendment, a due-process analysis is not appropriate.100
However, the court cautioned that its holding applies only to
executive actions as opposed to legislative enactments.101 That
is, if an executive act is at issue and is covered by the Fourth
Amendment, due-process analysis does not apply.102 An exec-
utive act in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would con-
stitute a due-process violation
only if it is “arbitrary” and
“shocking to the conscience.”103
On the other hand, if a legisla-
tive enactment at issue, due-
process analysis may apply.104
The rationale behind the execu-
tive-act-versus-legislative-enactment distinction is that sub-
stantive due process is most apt when invoked to protect indi-
vidual rights against systematic governmental invasion.105
Under the framework set forth in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, a DNA statute mandating DNA tests on all people
charged with felonies will be subject to due-process analysis if
it is legislative enactment. The statute mandating DNA tests is
undoubtedly a legislative enactment and therefore would not
preclude substantive due-process analysis.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS  
The Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights and
liberties that are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tra-
dition.”106 It “‘forbids the government to infringe . . . “funda-
mental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.’”107
Defendants might claim that liberty interests are affected
either at pretrial stages or at trial. The pretrial rights affected at
trial are privacy interests and the right not to offer inculpatory
evidence. On the other hand, the right implicated at trial is the
right to a fair trial.    
1. Pretrial rights affected: Privacy interests and the
right not to offer inculpatory evidence
Pretrial DNA testing involves an invasion of privacy because
DNA sampling involves physical intrusion.108 Privacy interests
are protected as liberty interests under the Due Process
Clause.109 Concerning the development of DNA-testing tech-
nology and its accuracy, mandatory DNA tests may be inculpa-
tory evidence. The defendant, however, has no duty to offer
such inculpatory evidence.110 The Due Process Clause places
the burden on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
91. Jay A. Zollinger, Comment, Defense Access to State-Funded DNA
Experts: Considerations of Due Process, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1803, 1810
(1997); Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 393 (Miss. 1992).
92. Zollinger, supra note 90, at 1835.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
97. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
98. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, Constitutional Law:
Due Process, 112 HARV. L. REV. 192, 195 (1998).
99. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quot-
ing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272, n.7 (1997)).
100.Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843. 
101.The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, supra note 98, at
195-96.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104.See Id.
105.The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, supra note 98, at
198 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due
Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 327 (1993)).
106.Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 504
(1977)).
107.Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993).
108.United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 84 (2d. Cir. 2007).
109.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
110.See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980).
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doubt all of the elements of
the charged offense.111
Therefore, a defendant has
no duty to disclose whatever
inculpatory evidence he
discovers.112 Because such
liberty interests are pro-
tected under the Due
Process Clause, the govern-
ment is depriving the defendants of those interests through pre-
trial DNA testing. The next question, then, is whether there is
a compelling government interest for mandating pretrial DNA
testing, and whether DNA testing is narrowly tailored to that
government interest. 
There is likely to be a compelling government interest
because due process is designed to “enhance the search truth
in the criminal trial” by assuring for both the defendant and
the government ample opportunity to investigate facts that are
crucial in determining guilt or innocence.113 DNA testing is
narrowly tailored to this interest. DNA evidence has a high
degree of accuracy in demonstrating a connection between evi-
dence and a specific individual or source.114 For instance, in a
murder case where the identity of the perpetrator is the key,
DNA evidence can be critical, especially when it is the only
forensic evidence available.115
In sum, privacy interests and the right not to offer inculpa-
tory evidence are outweighed by the government interests.
However, as demonstrated below, the result of applying the
due-process balancing test is different for the defendant’s right
to a fair trial.  
2. Rights affected at trial 
a) Right to a fair trial: encompassing the right to an
independent expert 
A fair trial is a central constitutional goal.116 Part of what
guarantees a fair trial is a defendant’s right under the Sixth
Amendment to confront witnesses as well as the right of com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in defendant’s favor.117
The Due Process Clause protects both as fundamental rights
essential to a fair trial.118
Under the Sixth Amendment, an accused can have a mean-
ingful confrontation of the State’s case at trial through the ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination and the presentation of
evidence from his own experts.119 “‘[T]he Confrontation
Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in what-
ever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”’”120
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that when the 
“‘[k]nowledge of the techniques of science and tech-
nology is sufficiently available, and the variables in tech-
niques few enough, . . .  the accused has the opportu-
nity for a meaningful confrontation of the
Government’s case at trial through the ordinary
processes of cross-examination of the Government’s
expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence
of his own experts.’”121
This suggests that even when the government’s evidence
involves science and technology, and knowledge about those
fields is widely available, a defendant’s meaningful challenge of
the government’s evidence should involve a separate expert
witness for the defendant. Moreover, given that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees an “opportunity for effective
cross-examination,” the presence of the defense’s own experts
is also a part of preparing for effective cross-examination. It
has been noted that DNA technology is complex, and thus it is
“doubtful that a defense attorney will have the requisite
knowledge to effectively examine autorads, laboratory books,
quality control tests, copies of reports by the testing labs, stan-
dard deviations, contaminants, etc., without expert assis-
tance.”122
b) Lack of an independent expert in the context of
DNA test results presented as evidence  
i) Violation of the right to fair trial 
As noted above, a DNA sample will be collected and ana-
lyzed by the government’s experts, and an indigent defendant
will have no opportunity to subject it to an analysis by an inde-
pendent expert. This deprives the defendant of his right to a
meaningful chance to confront the witness—the government’s
expert. Indeed, it might be argued that such a Confrontation
Clause violation is only harmless error. Currently all 50 states
have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the federal statute
also provides that courts’ “judgments shall not be reversed for
‘errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.’”123 Under the harmless-error rule, not all federal
constitutional errors are automatically deemed harmful.
However, Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless-
error analysis.124 Moreover, Confrontation Clause violations
will almost always constitute harmful errors.  
First, there may be problems in a particular case with how
the DNA was collected, examined in the laboratory, or inter-
111.Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
112.Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774.
113.Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
114.NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD S-5, 3-2 (2009),
http://ag.ca.gov/meetings/tf/pdf/2009_NAS_report.pdf.
115.See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 540 (2006).
116.Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
117.Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403, 405; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 45 n.5 (1987).
118.Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 45 n.5; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-
18 (1967).
119.See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
120.United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (quoting
Kentucky V. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)).
121.United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 315 (1973) (quoting Wade,
388 U.S. at 227-28).
122.Dubose, 662 So.2d at 1196.
123.Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2111).
124.Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
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preted, including mixed samples, limited amounts of DNA,
or biases due to the statistical interpretation of data from par-
tial profiles.125 Whether such contaminating factors are
involved can be best explained by an independent expert.
Although a lawyer is given an opportunity for cross-exami-
nation, he may not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses because of the intricacies of the tech-
nology involved.126
Second, without an expert of his own, the defendant will be
subject to an unfair trial because of the powerful impact of sci-
entific evidence presented by the government. Surveys of
summoned jurors in Michigan gauged their attitudes toward
scientific evidence. Jurors generally had high expectations
that they would be presented with scientific evidence.127
Moreover, jurors thought that DNA and other modern scien-
tific techniques were extremely accurate.128 Jurors viewed
DNA evidence to have a “‘special aura of credibility.’”129 One
study found that jurors rated DNA evidence as 95% accu-
rate.130
Therefore, by producing inculpatory evidence for the gov-
ernment without an analysis from an independent expert of his
own, the defendant will be subject to an unfair trial. The next
question then is whether there are compelling governmental
interests and whether pretrial DNA tests are narrowly tailored
to those interests. 
ii) Balancing against governmental interests
The government’s interest is identical to the defendant’s
interest—the search for truth, which can happen only through
allowing meaningful examination of the facts by both the pros-
ecution and the defendant.131 The Supreme Court has noted
that discovery in search for truth must be a “two-way
street.”132 Viewed in this manner, the balancing factors all go
against mandatory pretrial DNA testing. 
Moreover, such a conclusion is supported by the principle
underlying due process. If there is a “reasonable probability”
that prosecutorial argument undermines confidence in the
outcome, the defendant’s substantive due-process rights are
violated.133 If powerful scientific evidence is persuading the
fact-finders, and if the defense does not have an independent
expert to challenge it, there is a reasonable probability that the
prosecution’s DNA evidence will change the outcome—that is,
to convict a defendant who would otherwise not be convicted.
Therefore, the statute would result in a violation of the defen-
dant’s due-process right to a fair trial.  
B. PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS
Even if a substantive due-
process argument may not be
viable, the defendant may still
bring his claim under proce-
dural due process. Procedural
due process involves a two-
step analysis: (1) Did the
individual possess interests
protected under the Due
Process Clause? (2) Was the
individual afforded an appropriate level of process?134
1. Does the defendant arrested and charged with a
felony possess interests protected under the Due
Process Clause? 
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, a government may not “‘deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’”135 The
Due Process Clause protects an individual’s property and lib-
erty interests.136 In the context of DNA testing, the question is
whether the government violates any liberty interests of the
person arrested and charged with a felony when it compels
pretrial DNA testing. 
There are two conceivable claims regarding a liberty-inter-
est violation. First, pretrial DNA testing involves a privacy
invasion because DNA sampling involves physical intrusion.137
Second, mandatory DNA testing may violate the defendant’s
right not to offer inculpatory evidence.138 Even assuming that
these interests are protected under the Due Process Clause, the
question remains whether the defendant is afforded due
process—that is, an appropriate level of process. 
2. Was the individual afforded an appropriate level
of process?
If a government requires all defendants charged with a
felony to undergo DNA tests, the government is apparently not
affording the defendants with an evidentiary hearing of any
type before collecting DNA samples from them. Then the ques-
tion is whether providing for such a hearing still satisfies pro-
cedural due process.  Due process is a flexible concept that
calls for procedural protections as each particular situation
demands.139 This flexibility is “necessary to gear the process to
the particular need,” and therefore what process is due
125.NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 114, at 3-12. 
126.See Dubose, 662 So.2d at 1197.
127.Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Juror Expectations for Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases: Perceptions and Reality about the “CSI Effect”
Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 5, 10 (2010).
128.Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science
Challenges for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the
“Polybutadiene” Meets the “Bitumen,” 18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 377-
78 (2009).
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131.Williams, 399 U.S. at 82.
132.Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
133.See Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366 (11th Cir. 2001).
134.Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 934 (10th Cir. 2007).
135.Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
136.Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72
(1972).
137.Amerson, 483 F.3d at 84.
138.Turkish, 623 F.2d at 774.
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Court Review - Volume 48 145
Even if a 
substantive due-
process argument
may not be viable,
the defendant may
still bring his claim
under procedural
due process.
depends on the need to minimize
the risk of error.140 To determine
whether procedural due process
is satisfied, courts must consider:
“‘(1) the nature of the private
interest at stake, . . . (2) the value
of the additional safeguard, and
(3) the adverse impact of the
requirement upon the govern-
ment’s interests.’”141 With regard
to the first factor—the nature of
the private interest at stake—
courts look into the degree to which the defendant is entitled
to such interest.142 For example, a prisoner has only  limited
privacy interests. With regard to the second factor—the value
of the additional safeguard—the defendant must explain the
purpose that will be served by pre-deprivation hearings or
other processes.143
Under the framework, the first factor—nature of the pri-
vate interest at stake—may be critical, as it would be the case
with the right to fair trial. Nevertheless, the two remaining
factors weigh against providing for a pre-deprivation hearing.
First, the government has a compelling interest in seeking the
truth in a criminal trial through identifying the defendant.144
Moreover, pre-deprivation hearings or other additional safe-
guards are likely to serve that purpose. In Wilson v. Collins, the
Sixth Circuit discussed a statute requiring collection of DNA
samples from convicted felons. The court held that the lack of
a pre-deprivation hearing does not violate procedural due
process because the only criterion at the pre-deprivation hear-
ing would be the conviction for a predicate offense.145
Similarly, in a pre-deprivation hearing for a pretrial DNA test,
the only criterion is whether the defendant is arrested or
charged with a felony. Therefore, a pre-deprivation hearing
would serve little purpose for the defendant arrested or
charged with a felony. Lack of a pre-deprivation hearing for a
pretrial DNA testing is unlikely to violate procedural due
process.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, a government must not “‘deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.’”146 Essentially, all people similarly situated should
be treated alike.147 Therefore, a government violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it makes a classification in a way
that affects similarly situated groups in an unequal man-
ner.148 In the context of the DNA statute, the statute makes a
classification between people arrested for or charged with
felonies and people arrested for or charged with misde-
meanors. The question is whether those two groups of peo-
ple are similarly situated. 
Caselaw suggests that people convicted of felonies or con-
victed of misdemeanors are not similarly situated.149 A felon is
uniquely burdened by diverse statutorily imposed disabilities
long after his release from prison.150 On the other hand, when
misdemeanants conclude their sentences, they have no further
obligations nor loss of civil rights.151 Moreover, it is the leg-
islative function to draw a line between what classifies as a
felony or a misdemeanor.152 Courts are not in the position to
weigh the gravity of different criminal offenses and assess what
commensurate action should be taken.153
Likewise, people arrested for and charged with felonies and
people arrested for and charged with misdemeanors would
respectively be facing different obligations and risks of loss of
civil rights. Therefore, a facial equal-protection challenge to
the DNA statute is likely to be foreclosed because people
charged with felonies and those accused of misdemeanors are
not similarly situated. Nevertheless, a defendant may turn to a
disparate-impact analysis.  
Under the disparate-impact analysis, a statute otherwise
neutral on its face must not be applied to invidiously discrim-
inate an identifiable group.154 Felony arrestees or indictees
might claim that the facially non-discriminatory DNA statute
has a disproportionate impact on, for example, racial minori-
ties.155 However, a disparate impact upon an identifiable
group, while relevant, is not dispositive of whether a statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Unless the disparate
impact is traced to a discriminatory purpose, it may not sup-
port an equal-protection claim.156 Therefore, unless there are
facts connecting the disparate impact to any discriminatory
intent on the part of the government, people arrested for or
charged with felonies are not likely to persuade the court on
their disparate-impact claims. 
CONCLUSION
Current federal statutes and several state statutes require
DNA testing on all felony arrestees and indictees. Beyond con-
cerns about privacy of the defendants and the governmental
interests of solving crimes, there are more profound concerns
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behind the statutes. Results of DNA tests can be tainted when
laboratories are situated within law-enforcement agencies.
Defense counsel may not be able to effectively tackle such
tainted results when they are not sufficiently knowledgeable
about the complex DNA science. Particularly, when an indi-
gent defendant is not appointed an independent witness, his
counsel may provide ineffective assistance at trial.
Consequently, the DNA statutes result in depriving the defen-
dant of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the govern-
ment’s case at trial. That is, the effect of the DNA statutes
reaches the criminal defendant’s trial in the courtrooms.
Because of concern that the DNA statutes violate the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights under substantive due process and
the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, the constitutionality of such statutes should be
re-evaluated.  
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